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CRIMINAL LAW – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court order dismissing a production of child pornography charge, 
based on the conclusion that NRS 200.710 is unconstitutionally vague.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court reversed the district court’s order, holding that NRS 200.710 is not 
unconstitutionally vague because  the term “minor” as used in the statute refers to a person under 
eighteen years of age. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 The State of Nevada charged respondent Aaron Taylor Hughes (“Hughes”) with several 
criminal charges related to the production of child pornography involving a seventeen year old.  
At trial, Hughes filed a motion to dismiss the pornography charge under NRS 200.710 on the 
grounds that the word “minor” as used in the statute is unconstitutionally vague.  Under NRS 
200.710, a person who knowingly uses a minor in the production of sexual portrayals or 
performances is guilty of a felony.  However, the applicable definition section of the statute did 
not define whether the term “minor” applies to persons under the age of eighteen, or some other 
age.   
 
The district court concluded that NRS 200.710 was unconstitutionally vague, and that 
“minor” applied to individuals under sixteen years of age. Consequently, the court dismissed the 
pornography charge. The State appealed.  
 
Discussion 
 
 Constitutionality of a statute is a question of law that the Court reviews de novo.
2
  A 
court may find enough clarity to defeat a vagueness challenge by giving the words their “well-
settled and ordinarily understood meanings.”3  Accordingly, the Court determined that the term 
“minor” had a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning: an individual under eighteen 
years of age.   
 
To support this conclusion, the Court examined the dictionary definition of minor, which 
is “[a] person who has not reached full legal age.”4  NRS 129.010 defines legal age as eighteen 
years; therefore the term “minor” refers to those under the age of eighteen years.  Further, the 
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 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1017 (9th ed. 2009); See also WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 715 (3d ed. 
2008).  
Court noted that the Legislature has regularly defined “minor” as a person under the age of 
eighteen.
5
  Additionally, the Legislature has been consistently explicit when it adopted age 
thresholds other than eighteen years of age.
6
  The Legislature’s consistency demonstrates that 
when it intends a meaning for “minor” other than a person under eighteen years old, it explicitly 
modifies the age threshold.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 NRS 200.710 is not unconstitutionally vague because the term “minor” as used in the 
statute has a “well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning” of being under eighteen years old.  
Therefore, under NRS 200.710, it is a felony to use a person under eighteen years of age to 
produce a pornographic performance.  
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 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 609.440(1) (2007) (defining “minor” for employment provisions as an individual 
“less than 18 years of age”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.259 (2007) (defining “minor” for proscription against 
exhibition and sale of obscene materials as “any person under the age of 18 years”). 
6
 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 201.195 (creating more severe penalties for soliciting a minor who is “less than 14 
years of age”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.020-.055, 202.060 (establishing alcohol-related offenses for those under 21 
years of age). 
